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The subject matter of the paper is the pecuniary protection of patients’ rights in non-personal 
injury cases. The paper distinguishes between cases where the infringement of patients’ rights 
coincides with the infliction of physical injury (compensable damage), creating pecuniary claims, 
and cases where the violation of patients’ rights does not result in any damage (non-personal injury 
cases). On what basis should the patient be protected in the latter situation? The Author endorses 
the Polish solution contained in Article 4 of the Act on Patients’ Rights. A person who has suffered  
a violation of patient rights, regardless of whether he or she sustained any damage, has an explicit 
claim for pecuniary compensation that is separate from a claim for reparation of moral harm due  
to personal injury. Such a claim protects the dignity, privacy and autonomy of a patient, regardless  
of the diligence and effectiveness of any medical intervention. This paper examines the application 
of this rule by the Polish courts. The rule reflects the theory that most patients’ rights are civil 
personal interests that merit an express rule for their protection in order to abolish the requirement 
of proving that a certain right is recognized as a protected interest. The new Polish Act on Patients’ 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This article focuses on the legal nature of patients’ rights and the scope 
of protection granted to aggrieved patients by civil law. The discussion  
of patients’ rights is necessarily permeated by ethical, constitutional and 
international considerations. Several of the rights are rooted in values such 
as dignity, the autonomy of the patient, liberty and physical integrity. 
Therefore, we find them not only in the internationally binding documents, 
but also in European constitutions1. Personal freedom to decide about one’s 
own life and limb plays a central role in those regulations. The emphasis on 
rights rather than on duties reflects the demise of the paternalistic model  
of patient-doctor relations. From the perspective of private law violation  
of the rights gives rise to individual claims against the wrongdoer.  
 There are varying approaches to regulating patients’ rights in Europe: 
from the drafting of a separate law or a patients’ charter to incorporating 
the rights in different legal instruments regulating the functioning of  
a domestic health care systems2. Patients’ rights are often contained in  
a patients’ charter or incorporated into existing statutory acts. In Poland, 
until 2008 patients’ rights were protected by several regulations, among 
them: the Act on the Professions of Physician and Dentist (1996), the Act  
on Medical Care Establishments (1991, hereafter: MCE Act), the Act  
on Psychiatric Health Protection (1994), and the Code of Ethics for 
Physicians and Patient Rights Charter issued by the Ministry for Health3. 
The Act of 6 November 2008 on Patients’ Rights and the Patient 
Ombudsman4 (hereafter: the Patients’ Rights Act) established a regulatory 
                                                     
1 For example, the Polish Constitution of 1997 ensures the right to health protection, equal 
access to health care institutions financed from public sources within the law (Article 68), 
protection of life (Article 38), protection from medical experiments without a consent 
voluntarily expressed (Article 39), personal liberty (with limitations foreseen by the law;  
Article 41), legal protection of private and family life, respect for dignity, good reputation, 
and the right to decide upon one’s own personal life (Article 47), nationals’ access to official 
documents and data bases (Article 51) referred thereto, freedom of conscience and religion  
(Article 53). 
2 See M. Vienonen, The Role of the World Health Organization in Realising the Right to Health 
Care, [in:] A. Den Exter, H. Hermans (eds), The Right to Health Care in Several European 
Countries, Hague: Kluwer Law International 1998, p. 25 et seq. 
3 See M. Śliwka, Prawa pacjenta w prawie polskim na tle prawnoporównawczym [Patients’ Rights 
in Polish Law in a Comparative Perspective], Toruń: Dom Organizatora TNOiK 2008. 
4 Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] 2009, No. 52, item 417 and No. 76, item 641. 
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process to implement the European and worldwide standards in this field.  
The catalogue and contents of the rights were transferred with slight 
modifications from MCE Act to the Patients’ Right Act. Although parallel 
regulations were not abrogated, but only changed accordingly, the Act 
should now be considered a basic legal fundamental of patients’ rights  
in Poland. The catalogue of patients’ rights is contained in chapters 2–11  
of the Act. It includes the right to medical services, the right to information, 
the right to informed consent (with a specific regulation concerning minors 
and mentally incompetent patients), the right to intimacy and protection  
of dignity, the right to confidentiality, and the right of access to medical 
documentation. A new right to object to an opinion or decision of a doctor, 
as well as the right to safety of valuables deposited in a hospital,  
were added to this list. 
  
II. THE PLACE OF PATIENTS’ RIGHTS IN LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE CONTEXT 
OF LIABILITY RULES 
 
1. THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 
 
 In the theory of private law patients’ rights may be considered as 
personality interests (values) or as subjective rights aimed at the protection 
of personality interests (values)5. This differentiation has always been  
a bone of contention in Polish legal academic writing, which was attracted 
partly by the Germanic and partly by the French theories on personality 
rights. Depending on whether one accepts or rejects the partition and 
diffusion of the legal category of “protected personality values”; both 
approaches may offer an array of arguments supporting the view that 
patients’ rights belong to the category of personality interests.  
 According to the dominant view in Polish civil law writings, 
personality interests are considered objectively as values that have  
                                                     
5 See M. Nesterowicz, Prawa pacjenta i zadośćuczynienie pieniężne za ich naruszenie w prawie 
medycznym i cywilnym [Patients Rights and Compensation for Their Violation in Medical and Civil 
Law], Prawo i Medycyna [Law and Medicine; PiM] 2005, no. 2, p. 96, M. Safjan, Kilka refleksji 
wokół problematyki zadośćuczynienia pieniężnego z tytułu szkody wyrządzonej pacjentom [Some 
Reflections on the Compensation for Patients’ Injury], Prawo i Medycyna [Law and Medicine] 
2005, no. 1, p. 11 et seq.  
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an immaterial nature and are closely connected to human beings. Such 
values determine the existence and status of a person in society. Personal 
interests are not rooted in a legal relation, but in a legal norm based on 
objective and commonly accepted values and interests. These interests are 
immaterial, inalienable and absolute. The interests enumerated in Article 23 
of the Civil Code (kodeks cywilny, KC) are the most important personal 
interests, but this list is not exhaustive. In my view, a patient right may be 
classified as a private subjective right that exists independently from any 
private law relation, be it a contractual relation with a medical service 
provider or any public law relation with a health care institution which 
provides publicly financed services. Traditionally, the theory of civil law 
requires the sine qua non link between a subjective legal right and a legal 
relation. However, according to modern trends in legal writing although  
a person must be the subject of a legal right, the existence of a legal right is 
not conditional upon a person being in a legal relation6. Accordingly, most 
patients’ rights can be classified as subjective rights binding ex lege, 
regardless of a contractual or non-contractual character of the relationship 
between the doctor (service provider) and the patient7. If we assumed 
otherwise, i.e. that patients’ rights must always arise from an existing legal 
relation, we would put some rights out of the scope of protection. 
Therefore, it is better to say that patients’ rights are not rooted in a legal 
relation, but in a legal norm (rule) based on objective and commonly 
accepted values and interests.  
 As mentioned above, the legal fundament of these rights is of course 
not restricted to purely domestic rules. With respect to the contents of 
patients’ rights, the common standards stem primarily from the adaptation 
of the European legal systems to the Biomedical Convention8. This is also 
true for the countries that have not ratified the Convention yet, as for 
example Poland, where the Convention standards are being transposed  
                                                     
6 See M. Pyziak-Szafnicka, [in:] M. Safjan (ed.), System Prawa Prywatnego: Prawo  
cywilne – część ogólna [System of Private Law: Civil Law – General Part], vol. 1, Warszawa:  
C. H. Beck 2007, p. 700 et seq. 
7 See M. Kolasiński, Ochrona dóbr osobistych w prawie medycznym [Protection of Personality 
Interests in Medical Law], Prawo i Medycyna [Law and Medicine] 2002, no. 11, p. 42. 
8 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine adopted by the Council of Europe  
in Oviedo, opened for signature in April 1997. 
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to the national systems by courts and proclaimed by legal scholarship9. 
Conversely, the commonly accepted preferences for the protection  
of human dignity, life, and health exert a significant influence on the extent  
of the domestic protection of patients’ rights. This includes the shaping  
of legitimate expectations of citizens towards the State as regards  
the organization of health care services in a given area.  
 Moreover, it should be added that in the EU countries pursuant to the 
Directive 2011/24/EU of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights 
in cross-border healthcare10, patients should have a means of making 
complaints and be guaranteed remedies and compensation in accordance 
with the legislation of the Member State regarding treatment when they 
suffer harm arising from the cross-border healthcare they receive  
(Article 4)11. Whilst the first part of this new protection standard is fulfilled 
in most of the EU countries through the institution of ombudsmen,  
or incorporated in the no-blame alternative compensation system in 
existence, the second part (remedies and compensation) may be missing 
and at least varies to great extent.  
 At this point an additional interesting observation should be made 
regarding Polish law. The Polish Supreme Court denies unconditional 
inclusion of fundamental rights (such as e.g. the right to due process) in the 
category of personality interests12. The Court underlines that the right to 
due process, although warranted on international and constitutional levels, 
is granted to a person in connection with his or her status in the given 
sphere of social life. There is no ground to hold that all fundamental rights, 
as well as personal freedoms and interests listed in the Constitution, should 
be protected by the civil law (Article 24 KC). This position may have some 
                                                     
9 The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine in its Arts 5-9 lays down basic 
principles of the patients’ right to information. 
10 O. J. 2011, L 88/45. 
11 Recital 24 of the preamble; Member States should ensure that mechanisms for the 
protection of patients and for seeking remedies in the event of harm are in place for 
healthcare provided on their territory and that they are appropriate to the nature and extent 
of the risk. However, it should be for the Member State to determine the nature and 
modalities of such a mechanism. 
12 See Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court] in the judgment of 6.05.2010, II CSK 640/09, 
Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Zbiór Dodatkowy [Decisions of the Supreme Court – 
Supplement; OSN-ZD] 2011, no. A, item 4. 
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impact on the approach to those patients’ rights that are guaranteed on  
a constitutional or international level. 
 Finally, it should also be observed that under many systems,  
in particular in the former socialist countries, the theory that the legal 
status of a patient is subject to public law rules is still quite strongly 
supported by legal scholars13. On the one hand, public law theory is not 
without relevance to the juxtaposition of rights and duties of patients in the 
public health care systems14. On the other hand, in the ternary structure  
of the publicly financed health insurance (i.e.: the National Health Fund – 
health care service providers – patients) the determination of the nature  
of the relation between the patient and the service provider should not 
have any impact on the scope of the protection of the former’s rights and 
interests. Therefore, the approach that separates “universal patients’ rights” 
from any legal relations is worthy of approval. 
  
2. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CATEGORIZATION OF PATIENTS’ RIGHTS AS 
PERSONALITY INTERESTS OR SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS 
 
 According to the view presented herein most patient subjective rights 
protect the personality interests with which they are inherently 
connected15. For example, the right to informed consent or refusal of certain 
services protects the freedom and autonomy of a person; the right to die  
in dignity and the right to respect for privacy protect dignity, etc. By their 
nature these rights are immaterial and inalienable; they may as well be 
called absolute (as they bind all the world, i.e. erga omnes). It should  
be observed, however, that not all patient rights would fall under  
the category of absolute subjective rights16. Some of them should rather  
                                                     
13 See J. Bujny, Prawa pacjenta. Między autonomią a paternalizmem [Patients’ Rights. Between 
Autonomy and Paternalism], Warszawa: C. H. Beck 2007, p. 24 et seq. 
14 See M. Nesterowicz, E. Bagińska, A. den Exter, Poland. Medical Law, [in:] International 
Encyclopaedia of Laws, Warszawa: Kluwer Law International 2007, no. 31; the contributions by 
K. Tymowska, Z. Hartman, I. Zagar, J. Simek, [in:] Den Exter, Hermans (eds), supra note 2. 
15 The judgment of the Sąd Najwyższy [Supreme Court] of 7.11.2000, I CKN 1149/98,  
not published. 
16 Compare the division of patient legal rights in Sweden into primary rights (that can be 
fully enforced before an administrative courts), secondary rights (that reflect the obligations 
envisaged in law, but can be challenged on grounds of illegality) and tertiary rights 
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be described as relative subjective rights, which means that they should  
be correlated with a legal duty incumbent on a health care service provider 
(doctor, hospital, nurse, etc.). In particular, the right to health care services 
that meet the requirements of medical science is a right enforceable inter 
partes, i.e. only against a service provider17. On the other hand, the right  
to honest medical procedure based on medical criteria and determining  
the priority of access to services in cases of limited availability may be 
treated either as a subjective relative right or as a right emanating from  
the principle of equal treatment. The right to quality care or the right  
to freely choose a health professional are subject to limited resources  
and hence any reasonable restrictions, subject to non-discrimination and 
proportionality, seem to put acceptable limits to the legal protection. Some 
authors distinguish positive and negative patients’ rights, while observing 
that the latter enjoy better protection of civil law18.  
 In many continental systems the determination of the relationship 
between patients’ rights (typically found in separate statutes) and the 
general system of protection of personality rights (that is typically found in 
a civil code) is an important and practical issue. Viewed from  
a comparative perspective, the issue of remedying infringements of 
personality rights is highly complex. The different systems of protection 
that operate in Europe vary from the general rule of liability (France, Spain, 
Belgium), or the general rule of protection of all personality interests or of 
specific personality rights (whilst this category is open to development  
by the courts, e.g. in Poland, Greece, the Netherlands, Germany), to the 
systems where no universal personality right has been acknowledged (as in 
England). Factors such as difficulties in categorizing the area of personality 
rights, and the overlapping of certain rights and systematic cultural 
differences significantly impede any comparative analysis19. 
                                                                                                                                 
(enforceable only in special courts). See L. Fallberg, E. Borgenhammar, Patient  
Rights – a Swedish Perspective, European Journal of Health Law 1995, no. 2, pp. 341-342. 
17 See Śliwka, supra note 3, p. 37. 
18 See J. Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, pp. 18-19.  
19 See W. V. H. Rogers, Comparative Report, [in:] W. V. H. Rogers (ed.), Damages for  
Non-Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective, Wien-New York: Springer 2001, p. 279 et seq.;  
C. van Dam, European Tort Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006, pp. 149-150. 
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 With respect to personal injury cases, in principle, compensation  
of non-pecuniary loss is not questioned in any European country, although 
the legal grounds for reparation, its scope and the actual awards differ 
considerably from system to system20. A thorough comparative analysis 
has shown that the dominant (if not exclusive) purpose of these damages  
in the context of personal injury is compensation21. As the aim of damages 
is to compensate non-pecuniary harm that per se is hardly measurable, 
jurisprudence has developed several criteria for assessment of the 
damages. Each case of bodily injury and mental harm requires  
an individual approach with regard to the facts of the case. Tariffs and rigid 
schemes are for some countries unthinkable, but they exist in others.  
It should be noted that in a vast majority of countries there exist no tables 
that systematically report the amounts of compensation granted by courts.  
 There are bigger discrepancies in Europe with respect to compensation 
for non-pecuniary loss in non-personal injury cases. It should firstly  
be observed that apart from the primary compensation function, in at least 
four countries the subsidiary punitive function of the damages  
is recognized (e.g. England, Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands), and  
in some others it is done so more covertly. More importantly, the courts  
in some countries (e.g. France, England) have held that lack of proof of 
actual damage will not bar a claim for compensation for non-pecuniary loss  
(at least not in defamation and other cases of infringement of personality 
interests). For example, Article 9 of the French Civil Code states that  
the victim whose privacy has been invaded may ask the judge to take 
appropriate measures to prevent or put the invasion to an end, which 
includes damages that will be assessed pursuant to the general tort rules. 
However, a French court usually explains in its decision that the damage 
through an invasion of privacy consists in the infringement of the victim’s 
natural feeling of decency22. 
 Notwithstanding the mentioned discrepancies, the convergence  
of national systems is made visible by the practice of the European Court  
of Human Rights (ECHR). The Court has to consider in particular to what 
                                                     
20 See van Dam, supra note 19, pp. 322-323. 
21 See Rogers, supra note 19, p. 251. 
22 See S. Galand-Carval, Non-Pecuniary Loss Under French Law, [in:] Rogers (ed.), supra  
note 19, p. 103. 
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extent a patient right imposes a positive obligation upon the State23. It has, 
for instance, applied Article 8 of the ECHR to enhance protection of the 
right to privacy and family life against non-state respondents (see below  
in the section on reproductive torts).  
 The legal implications of the categorization of personality interests  
and rights may be illustrated by German case law. The general personality 
right developed by the Bundesgerichtshof for the better protection of human 
dignity has proved an effective instrument for protecting all kinds of 
aspects of the person24. This notion allowed for awarding compensation  
in medical law cases in which it was hard to establish the violation of the 
right to bodily integrity or the right to health, i.e. the protected interests 
explicitly mentioned in § 823 I BGB. For instance, the infringement of the 
general personality right was found in a case of disclosing medical data  
to third parties without the consent of the person involved, or in a case  
of destruction of a man’s sperm without his consent after a surgical 
procedure that involved the inherent risk that he would become infertile.  
It is nevertheless observed that the fact of the violation of a general 
personality right is not easily established in court25. 
 As concerns the question of liability towards the patient we should 
distinguish between cases where the infringement of patients’ rights 
coincides with the infliction of physical injury, and cases where the 
violation of patients’ rights does not result in any ‘physical harm’  
(non-personal injury cases). Examples of conduct not bringing about 
personal injury include for example: committal proceedings of patients  
to psychiatric hospitals, refusing access to medical files, or lack of informed 
consent to a medical procedure which proved successful. The proposed 
distinction is of course a matter of convention. It may easily be abolished 
on the grounds of the definition of damage. Even though at the outset  
it would seem that any kind of grievance is potentially covered by the 
notion of damage, it is clear that not every harm suffered by another person  
is compensable under tort law. It is agreed that establishing an obligation 
                                                     
23 See M. Davis, Textbook on Medical Law, London: Butterworths 1998, pp. 16-17; I. Kennedy, 
A. Grubb, Medical Law, London: Butterworths 2000, p. 31. 
24 See B. Markesinis, H. Unberath, The German Law of Torts. A Comparative Treatise, Oxford: 
Hart Publishing 2002, pp. 412-415. 
25 See van Dam, supra note 19, pp. 76-77. 
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to compensate for the damage requires an interference with a legally 
protected interest26. Hence, viewed from the angle of a commonly accepted 
definition of damage, the very violation of a patient right, which is a legally 
protected interest, will constitute harm27. This harm may be material  
or immaterial. An immaterial damage is defined as “loss which is not 
damage to a person’s assets, wealth or income and which is therefore 
incapable of being quantified in any objective financial manner  
by reference to a market”28. For some national systems it would not seem 
incorrect to say that there is harm, but no compensable damage.  
 The foregoing analysis allows for the conclusion that the regime  
of liability for violations of patients’ rights and the availability of a claim 
for damages is directly dependent on the status and the theoretical nature 
of the rights accepted in a given system. When the violation of a patient 
right does not lead to bodily injury, pain, and suffering, or mental distress 
amounting to a compensable moral harm, the patient’s claim for reparation 
in money is not so obvious. It follows from the above that, depending  
on the system, such a claim may be conditioned upon proving that  
1) a given interest is a legally protected interest, and/or 2) that this 
particular interest is protected by a claim for damages, and not just  
by another remedy (such as by a claim for an apologetic or corrective 
statement by a wrongdoer, or an order to abstain from infringement).  
The question as to the basis on which the aggrieved patient should  






                                                     
26 See H. Koziol, [in:] European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law. Text and 
Commentary, Wien, New York: Springer 2005, pp. 24, 27. 
27 The answer may naturally depend on the approach of the particular legal system to the 
notion of personal injury. See B. Koch, H. Koziol, Comparative Analysis, [in:] B. Koch,  
H. Koziol (eds), Compensation for Personal Injury in a Comparative Perspective, Wien, New York: 
Springer 2003, pp. 410-411. 
28 See Rogers, supra note 19, p. 246. 
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III. THE BASIS AND PREMISES OF THE CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION FOR THE 
VIOLATION OF PATIENTS’ RIGHTS 
 
1. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE CLAIM IN POLISH LAW 
 
 In this article I argue that a person harmed by a violation of patient 
rights which did not relate to any material damage should have an explicit 
claim for pecuniary compensation. I am convinced that a claim for  
non-pecuniary loss is a most important and effective civil sanction in cases 
of infringement of patients’ rights. In Poland, this solution was envisaged 
for more than a decade by the Medical Care Establishment Act29 and then 
transferred to the 2008 Patients’ Rights Act. It has also been introduced  
in several other systems (among others in the Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Finland, and Portugal)30. 
 The strengthening of the patient’s position in Poland first took place  
in 1997 through the enactment of Article 19a of the MCE Act (now Article 4  
of the Patients’ Rights Act)31, which provided for compensation in the case 
of violations of rights envisaged in Articles 18 and 19 of the MCE Act.  
As Poland belongs to the group of systems where damages for non-
pecuniary loss may be awarded in specific cases only32, one of the effects  
of the 1997 changes to the MCE Act was to introduce a specific legal avenue 
for seeking pecuniary remedies by patients’ whose rights were infringed33. 
 The Patients’ Rights Act has not changed the main rules on liability  
for infringement of patients’ rights. It stipulates a claim for compensation 
in Article 4. A person harmed by a negligent breach of patient rights may 
claim pecuniary compensation for moral damage in an action based 
                                                     
29 In Polish law patient rights are protected by several regulations. Among them of most 
importance are: the Act of 5.12.1996 on the Professions of Physician and Dentist, the Act of 
30.08.1991 on Medical Care Establishments, and the Code of Ethics for Physicians and Patient 
Rights Charter issued by the Ministry for Health. 
30 See B. A. Koch, Medical Malpractice in Europe: Comparative Analysis, [in:] B. A. Koch (ed.), 
Medical Liability in Europe. A Comparison of Selected Jurisdictions, Berlin: de Gruyter 2011. 
31 O. J. 1997, No. 104, item 661. 
32 See E. Bagińska, M. Nesterowicz, Non-Pecuniary Loss under Polish Law, [in:] Rogers (ed.), 
supra note 19, p. 173. 
33 See Nesterowicz, Bagińska, den Exter, supra note 14, no. 142. 
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 on Article 448 KC34 (Article 4 sec. 1). In a case of breach of the right to die 
in dignity, a spouse, the next of kin, or a guardian may claim a sum of 
money to be paid for the benefit of a charitable institution (Article 4 sec. 2). 
Traditionally, the courts have viewed a claim for the account of a charity 
(based on Article 448 KC in fine) as a private (civil) penalty35. The sum 
awarded to a charitable institution indeed plays two functions:  
a compensation function and a deterrence function. I believe that the same 
functions might be assigned to the claim for the account of a charity based 
on Article 4 sec. 2 of the Patients’ Rights Act.  
 The dominant doctrinal opinion holds that although Article 19a  
of the MCE Act (now Article 4 of the Patients’ Rights Act) refers to 
Article 448 KC, the plaintiff does not need to prove a violation of  
a particular personality right. In a way, Article 4 of the Patients’ Rights 
“assists” a patient in the establishment of his claim by providing for explicit 
situations in which a claim for damages shall arise. The discussed ground 
of compensatory claim applies both to contractual and to tortious 
violations. We should also add that on 9 September 200836 the Supreme 
Court (the panel of 7 judges) ruled that a party injured by the violation  
of personality interests might demand, on the basis of Article 448 KC,  
the payment of damages for both herself and a social institution in order  
to reach full satisfaction. This approach had already been taken in a few 
earlier cases37. An opposite view (in fact, prevailing in doctrine) argues that 
the claimant whose personal interests have been violated may demand 
only one type of compensation to be paid, either for his benefit or for  
                                                     
34 Article 448 KC reads: “In the case of infringement of personal interests, the court may 
award an injured person an adequate sum as compensation for non-pecuniary loss or, if he 
so demands, award an appropriate sum for a designated social purpose, irrespective of other 
means necessary to eliminate the effects of the damage caused”. 
35 See the judgment of the SN of 19.06.2007, III CZP 54/07, Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego 
- Izba Cywilna - Zbiór Dodatkowy [Decisions of the Supreme Court – Supplement;  
OSNC-ZD] 2008, no. B, item 36; the judgment of the SN of 9.09.2008, III CZP 31/08, 
Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna [Decisions of the Supreme Court – Civil 
Chamber] 2009, no. 3, item 36. 
36 III CZP 31/08, Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna [Decisions of the 
Supreme Court – Civil Chamber; OSNC] 2009, no. 3, item 36. 
37 For instance: judgment of the SN of 16.04.2002, V CKN 1010/00, Orzecznictwo Sądu 
Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna [Decisions of the Supreme Court – Civil Chamber; OSNC] 2003, 
no. 4, item 56 and judgment of the SN of 17.03.2006, I CSK 81/05, Orzecznictwo Sądów 
Polskich [Decisions of Polish Courts; OSP] 2007, no. 3, item 30. 
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the designated social purpose. The latter claim is independent of other 
remedies and only special circumstances may justify a court’s refusal  
to award damages for non-pecuniary loss. The function of art. 448 KC is  
to compensate the loss rather than to prevent harm38.  
 Although ex Article 19a of the MCE Act provided for the protection  
of the rights enumerated in Article 18 and 19 of the MCE Act39, it was given 
an extensive interpretation. As a result, any patient right guaranteed by  
a statute related to the provision of health care fell within the scope  
of Article 448 KC40. Moreover, should a “new” patient’s right be a subject  
of a debate and dependent on a court’s recognition41, Article 448 KC will 
provide a legal ground for seeking compensation for negligent 
infringement of the right. The outcome of any “new” case might 
nevertheless depend on a court’s approach to the burden of proof.  
                                                     
38 The interpretation of Article 448 KC endorsed in the commented decision of 9 September 
2008 seemingly shows a more modern approach to the protection of personality rights. If an 
aggrieved party is to achieve full satisfaction by demanding payment of damages for both 
herself and a social institution, the law should enable her to make such claims. It is for the 
courts to put reasonable limits to the application of the cumul of claims. 
39 According to Article 19 of the MCE Act a patient had a right to: 1) health care services 
which meet the requirements of medical science, and, in cases of limited availability of 
provision of treatment, to honest medical procedure based on medical criteria and 
determining the priority of access to those services, 2) be informed of his health condition,  
3) informed consent or refusal of certain services, 4) respect for privacy and dignity while 
receiving health care services, 5) die in peace and dignity. Moreover, in medical institutions 
destined for persons requiring constant or daily health care patients had also the right to 
additional nursing aid performed by a close or individually designated person, to personal, 
telephone or mail contact with persons from outside the institutions and to pastoral care. 
Hospitals ensure the protection of the patient’s data and medical charts, which may  
be accessed only by the patient or his proxy or guardian or by other institutions when  
a statute so allows (Article 18 of the MCE Act). This included the right to informed consent  
or refusal of certain services, to be informed of the health condition, to respect for privacy 
and dignity while undergoing health care activities and to die in peace and dignity.  
40 According to Polish law, in the case of negligent disclosure by a Health Insurance Fund  
of personal data and information concerning the condition of health and the mode  
of treatment of an insured person, a court may award the injured person appropriate 
compensation for the ensuing harm. The provision of Article 4c the Law on Family Planning 
imposes on persons carrying out services regulated by the statute (i.e. physicians performing 
abortion or giving medical advice to a pregnant woman) a duty to keep confidential all 
information provided in connection with the services. Negligent breach of confidence entitles 
the patient to compensation for non-pecuniary loss. 
41 For example, is there an unconditional right of a child to know who their biological father 
is? This right was recognized in the Swedish Insemination Act of 1984, although it had been 
vigorously debated. See Fallberg, Borgenhammar, supra note 16, p. 342. 
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In a “typical” situation of a violation of personality interests the plaintiff 
has to allege an infringement of a legally acknowledged personal interest 
within the meaning of Article 448 KC. With respect to patients’ rights,  
the practice of lower courts has not been uniform owing to the theoretical 
constraints mentioned above. In my opinion, regardless of which theory  
a court accepts, it should take advantage of the fact that many patient 
rights that are not expressly granted in the domestic legal system have been 
articulated on the supranational level, and especially in the Biomedical 
Convention. This approach should facilitate the position of the aggrieved 
patient in court. 
 Hence, in Polish law, two bases for pecuniary redress are available for 
the patient. The first one covers the situation when a patient suffered  
a medical malpractice that inflicted pain and suffering (Article 445 KC)42. 
The second one relates to an infringement of patient rights enumerated  
in the Patients’ Rights Act. The determination of the legal basis for any 
action belongs to the court, depending on the findings. However,  
the interpretation of the relationship between the two grounds has  
been a rather controversial issue. Although Polish law recognises  
the concurrence of causes of liability, so a claim for non-pecuniary loss can 
be based on either ground, the lower courts sometimes ignore the rule facta 
probantur, iura novit curia. The Supreme Court has held that the discussed 
causes of actions are separate and independent avenues for seeking 
compensation because of their different scopes of protection43. Already  
in the judgment of 14 October 200544 the Supreme Court allowed  
the application of Article 445 KC in the case of a violation of patient right  
to informed consent coinciding with personal injury stemming from 
medical malpractice. This approach was confirmed in the judgment  
of 29 May 2007 (V CSK 76/07). In this case the plaintiff did not consent  
to the amputation of one of the fingers cut by a saw. The doctor at first 
suggested its attaching, but during the treatment of the wound changed his 
                                                     
42 See more K. Bączyk-Rozwadowska, Medical Malpractice and Compensation in Poland, 
Chicago-Kent Law Review 2011, vol. 86, p. 1251. 
43 Judgment of the SN of 29.05.2007, V CSK 76/07, Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego 
[Decisions of Supreme Court; OSN] 2008, no. 7-8, item 91. 
44 III CK 99/05, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich [Decisions of Polish Courts; OSP] 2008, no. 6, 
item 68. 
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decision and eventually amputated the finger. The defendant hospital was 
not prepared to perform any microsurgical procedures because of the lack 
of specialists and equipment. The surgeon neither sought a second opinion 
nor considered the possibility of replanting with any of the microsurgery 
centres. According to an expert witness, the plaintiff had less than 50% 
chance of a successful replanting. The lower courts differed in the 
evaluation of the evidence. The regional court found that the doctor had 
committed medical malpractice and violated the patient’s right to informed 
consent. Accordingly, it awarded damages for pain and suffering.  
The appellate court dismissed the case by ruling to the contrary.  
On cassation, the Supreme Court convincingly advocated the theory of two 
alternative avenues for compensation, putting emphasis on the purpose  
of both regulations: Article 445 KC aims at compensation for pain and 
suffering due to personal injury while Article 19a of the former MCE Act 
(now Article 4 of the Patients’ Rights Act) protects dignity, privacy and 
autonomy of a patient, regardless of the diligence and effectiveness of  
a medical intervention. Hence, the two rules establish liability for two 
different wrongful acts.  
 Interestingly, in the judgment of 13 June 200745 the Court of Appeals  
in Warsaw established the hospital’s liability for the lack of informed 
consent to cardiac surgery, during which the patient suffered a stroke.  
The patient became disabled due to the neurological damage, however,  
no medical error was established at trial. The plaintiff claimed PLN 250,000,  
the Regional Court awarded PLN 50,000 as damages for moral harm, but 
the sum was doubled on appeal (final award PLN 100,000). This award  
is unusually high as for compensation for lack of informed consent; 
therefore we may suspect that the disability of the patient, for which no one 
was to blame, did, in fact, influence the calculation of the award.  
 The theory of concurrent grounds for compensation in cases  
of violation of the patient’s right to informed consent co-existing with 
medical malpractice finds significant support in legal scholarship46.  
The opposite view assumes a lex specialis – lex generalis relation between 
                                                     
45 VI ACa 1246/06, Orzecznictwo Sądów Apelacyjnych [Decisions of the Courts of Appeal], 
2009, no. 12, item 64, noted by M. Świderska, Przegląd Sądowy [Judicial Review] 2010, no. 11, 
p. 201. 
46 See Śliwka, supra note 3, p. 334; Nesterowicz, supra note 5, p. 84; Safjan, supra note 5, p. 5. 
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Article 4 of the Patients’ Rights Act and Article 445 KC. In consequence,  
it unreasonably restricts the catalogue of the patients’ rights protected  
by a claim for damages to only those rights expressly listed in the Act. 
Given the general and open formula of personality rights in Polish law  
as well as the dynamic development of international and European 
regulation of patients’ rights, one can easily predict that the catalogue  
of the rights will most probably expand in future. Therefore, the more 
extensive construction of Article 4 of the Patients’ Rights Act, the better for 
the patient. 
 In the light of European developments one may argue that when  
the plaintiff shows in a personal injury case that his patient rights were also 
violated, or that the personal injury stems from a violation of patients’ 
rights, the latter fact should probably be reflected in the overall award for 
non-pecuniary loss (increasing the quantum damages)47.  
 
2. FAULT AS A PREMISE OF LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF PATIENTS’ RIGHTS 
 
 There are several arguments that can be advanced in favour of  
a general rule according to which in the absence of physical personal 
injury, negligence of the actor should be the precondition of liability  
for the infringement of patients’ rights.  
 First of all, as was mentioned before, although there are vast 
discrepancies in the European systems with respect to the basis and 
premises of liability for non-pecuniary loss in non-personal injury cases, 
there seems to be an accord as to fault as a requirement for pecuniary 
protection of personality rights. Fault and the burden of proving it are  
of course shaped in numerous ways, but this issue is outside the scope  
of the analysis.  
 One should point to the fact that even in the systems where personal 
injury is redressed regardless of fault of a tortfeasor (on the grounds  
                                                     
47 Subject to the national rules on liability and on damages. Whether this part of the award 
will be easy to identify, is a totally different matter. It would be possible to deduce this 
element from a French judgment, because a court in France usually explains all heads of the 
damage, but it would be quite unlikely with respect to Spanish judicial decisions, which tend 
to contain three parts of or one global award, see the French report (by S. Galand-Carval) and 
the Spanish report (by M. Martín-Casals, J. Ribot ans J. Solé) [in:] Rogers (ed.), supra note 19, 
p. 89 et seq. and p. 213 et seq., respectively. 
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of strict liability or of equity)48, the divorce from fault may not necessarily 
be effective with respect to the non-pecuniary loss accompanying bodily 
injury (e.g. Austria, Italy). Correspondingly, most no-blame compensation 
systems exclude from their coverage a claim for compensation of  
non-pecuniary loss arising from personal injury, thus leaving it to  
the determination of common courts. 
 In modern tort law the subjective notion of fault has been transformed, 
perhaps with the exception of Austria, into a predominantly objective 
element. All systems tend to ignore individual abilities and deficiencies  
of the defendant by focusing almost exclusively on an objective assessment  
of the actor’s behaviour, thereby restricting the availability of excuses  
to those lacking culpability49. Hence, professional misconduct will 
principally amount to negligence.  
 The burden of proving fault can of course be alleviated by many 
popular instruments, such as legal and factual presumptions or a formal 
shift of the burden of proof. In a case of a medical professional or health 
care institution, fault may be presumed from the very breach of a legal 
duty (in some systems it is called wrongfulness or breach of statutory 
duty). The practice of Polish courts indicates that proof of fault in cases  
of infringement of patient rights imposes no significant burden on patients. 
Two examples are illustrative. In a case of 14 November 200550 the plaintiff 
sued a hospital for the removal of her kidney without informed consent. 
She alleged that the surgery caused her serious personal injury and was 
performed for a transplantation purpose, instead of for a therapeutic one. 
The regional court dismissed the suit. On evidence, the plaintiff’s 
allegations proved unsubstantiated, the operation rescued her life and it 
was carried out with due diligence. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, 
                                                     
48 The remedying of the pecuniary damage in personal injury cases in the context of the 
violation of the right to safety of hospitalization is most challenging. The evolution  
of national laws and case law (e.g. in France, Belgium) indicates the importance of the right 
to safety (of hospitalisation) and the shift towards strict liability. Most of the European opinio 
iuris agree that the rules on liability in the case of patients’ right to safety (of hospitalisation) 
should be stricter (i.e. separated from the requirement of fault). 
49 See B. Koch, H. Koziol, Comparative Analysis, [in:] Koch, Koziol (eds), supra note 27,  
pp. 410-411. 
50 III CK 99/05, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich [Decisions of Polish Courts; OSP] 2008, no. 6, 
item 68. 
62   |   Ewa Bagińska 
held that the plaintiff had been operated on without prior formal consent51. 
The plaintiff proved that she had not been informed before the operations 
in a straightforward manner on the scope and degree of the risks, hence 
without this awareness she could not have given an informed consent52. 
Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to pecuniary damages for the 
infringement of patients’ rights on the basis of ex Article 19a of the MCE 
Act, even though the doctor’s performance was lege artis and no damage 
occurred. In another case, the Court of Appeals in Poznań53 held that  
a breach of the duty to inform about a contagious disease constituted a tort 
and that when a patient had been transmitted an infectious disease while 
hospitalised, the hospital’s liability extended to all damage caused to him 
and to his family members. Although it was not established whether  
the hospital in fact informed the patient himself about the HCV virus,  
the court did not consider it critical to the question of liability for  
the plaintiffs’ injuries. 
 In most systems fault seems to be relevant, whether as a premise  
of liability or as a factor in the determining the amount of damages for  
non-pecuniary loss. Although in adjudication of the damages for the 
violation of personal interests a court should primarily take into 
consideration the type of protected interest, the extent of the non-pecuniary 
loss, the nature of the results of infringement, the financial situation of  
the liable person, etc.54, the conduct of the tortfeasor is not insignificant. 
There is a vast difference between the systems in continental and common 
law Europe with respect to the recognition of a direct punitive role for civil 
damages. It is nevertheless agreed that deterrence and prevention have  
a more important role to play in cases of infringement of personality 
                                                     
51 There are only a few exceptions to the rule that the informed consent of a patient is the  
pre-requirement of a doctor’s medical intervention. According to case law acting without  
a prior patient’s consent (or a substitute consent) constitutes a doctor’s fault (in his case, 
imputable to the defendant hospital). See M. Nesterowicz, Prawo medyczne [Medical Law], 
Toruń: Dom Organizatora TNOiK 2007, p. 122 et seq. 
52 Judgment of the SN of 17.12.2004, II CK 303/04, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich [Decisions 
of Polish Courts; OSP] 2005, no. 11, item 131. 
53 Judgment of 9.05.2002, ACa 221/02, Prawo i Medycyna [Law and Medicine; PiM] 2004, 
 no. 1, p. 116. 
54 See Bagińska, Nesterowicz, supra note 32, pp. 180, 186. 
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interests than in the case of personal injury and that the pecuniary sanction 
must be a serious one55. 
 
IV. SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF ABORTION (REPRODUCTIVE TORTS) CASES 
 
 A good example of viewing patients’ rights as a type of personality 
rights for the sake of seeking compensation for their violation  
is reproductive torts cases, embracing claims for wrongful birth and 
wrongful conception56. As I have argued elsewhere, one of the major 
theoretical concepts underlying the remedying of infringements that 
constitute damage in wrongful birth actions is based on the general 
protection of personal rights57. Although this ground of compensation  
is recognized in almost all European jurisdictions, its shape, and sometimes 
even its name, strictly depends on national regulatory restraints concerning 
abortion as well as on constitutional jurisprudence. Beyond doubt, this 
theory of compensation is heavily permeated by moral arguments.  
The most popular and least contested concept refers to the infringement  
of a woman’s right to self-determination. This right embraces inter alia  
the possibility of deciding about having children, which in turn involves 
the exercise of a “freedom of procreation”. Violation of the right may 
appear both in wrongful conception and in wrongful birth actions  
in the narrow sense both in American jurisprudence and in Europe58. 
 It may also be argued that when a woman is entitled to specialised 
prenatal examinations or to a referral to further genetic tests, any refusal  
of such a referral amounts to a violation of the patient’s rights which merits 
an adequate remedy59. The nature of the harm is particular; it consists of, 
but is not limited to, the distress and frustration flowing from  
the awareness of hopelessness and the failure of the doctors to perform 
                                                     
55 See Rogers, supra note 19, pp. 289-291, 295. 
56 See E. Bagińska, Wrongful Birth and Non-Pecuniary Loss: Theories of Compensation, Journal of 
European Tort Law 2010, vol. 2, pp. 171-203. 
57 Ibid., p. 186. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., p. 193. 
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their duties60. The most important duty in this context is the duty to inform  
a patient so that she has grounds to make an informed and independent 
decision about the most important personal matters. The same is true with 
respect to a right to a legally justified abortion61.  
 For example, German courts hold that regular consultations  
in pregnancy, such as genetic screening, other prenatal tests and  
the practice of eugenic abortion, serve to prevent the birth of severely 
handicapped children. In a case decided in 2002 the parents were granted 
compensation for pecuniary damage as well as for pain and suffering in the 
amount of € 10,000 because of the incomplete information given to them, 
which was regarded as a medical error62. In this case the child was born 
with highly abnormal arms, legs and extremities. Although the mother had 
regularly attended the defendant doctor and repeatedly asked about  
the development of the foetus, the doctor did not alert the plaintiffs when 
some part of the data in fact indicated difficulties 20 weeks after 
conception63. In France, on the other hand, a mother would be entitled to 
seek non-pecuniary damages only if she has given birth to a handicapped 
child, unless we have a case of a préjudice particulier, i.e. a special loss that 
exceeds the normal burdens of motherhood64. 
 The discussed theory is to be found in the Polish cases on wrongful 
conception and wrongful birth65. The Supreme Court acknowledges,  
in general, that a right to plan a family is protected by the Civil Code  
(Article 23 KC) as a personality right and by the Constitution as liberty66. 
Hence, if abortion was wrongfully denied to a raped woman and she was 
compelled to give birth to a child, her right to plan a family was violated, 
                                                     
60 Judgment of the SN of 12.06.2008, III CSK 16/08, Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba 
Cywilna [Decisions of the Supreme Court – Civil Chamber; OSNC] 2009, no. 3, item 48. 
61 I use the term “right” here in the sense of a subjective civil law right, but as an entitlement 
(or faculty) grounded in public healthcare law, which is nevertheless protected by both 
public law and private law means. 
62 BGH 18.06.2002, Medizinrecht [MedR] 2002, 640, cited by Bagińska, supra note 56,  
pp. 193-194. 
63 See Bagińska, supra note 56, p. 194. 
64 See van Dam, supra note 19, p. 159. 
65 See E. Bagińska, The Liability for Wrongful Conception and Wrongful Birth in Polish Law,  
Lex Medicinae. Revista Portuguesa de Direito da Saude 2009, no. 10, p. 46. 
66 V CK 16/03, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich [Decisions of Polish Courts; OSP] 2004, no. 10, 
item 125 = Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna [Decisions of the Supreme Court 
– Civil Chamber; OSNC] 2004, no. 6, item 104. 
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which gives a ground for seeking compensation on the basis of  
Article 448 KC. However, the Court’s classification of the right to planned 
family as a personality right under the Law on Family Planning67 met with 
substantial doctrinal criticism, based upon the assumption that there is  
no conflict between the right to live and the right to an abortion, since  
the former always prevails68. Thus, in the judgment of 22 February 200669,  
the Supreme Court modified its position. It held that “in a case where  
an abortion was wrongfully denied to a raped woman and the offender has 
not been identified, the person responsible for the denial is liable to cover 
the cost of the child support to the extent that cannot be covered by its 
mother who exercises personal care of the child”. Although it again 
allowed a claim for compensation, the Court refused to categorise the 
“right to abortion” as a personality interest. According to the Court such  
a protected interest does not follow from Article 4a sec. 1 of the Law on 
Family Planning. This provision has not conferred any right to abortion  
on a pregnant woman, but has only abrogated the general unlawfulness of 
abortion under Polish law in situations of conflict between the foetus’ right 
to life and other interests. The Court shared the view of the Constitutional 
Tribunal, expressed in its judgment of 28 May 199770, that the Polish legal 
system ensures constitutional protection of the life of the foetus, based on 
the concept that a human life has to be legally protected at all stages  
of development, and emphasized that “one may not construe a personality 
right to violate a personality interest of another in the case of a collision  
of interests”. A right to abortion is not a component of a right to plan  
a family71. The right to decide about having children has its negative 
aspect, i.e. the refusal of a child’s conception. However, when the child has 
already been conceived the only positive aspect it has is the right to give 
                                                     
67 The Act of 7.01.1993 on Family Planning, Fetus Protection and Conditions of Permission of 
Abortion, Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] No. 17, item 78 with later amendments. 
68 See S. Rudnicki, Note to the Judgment, Monitor Prawniczy [Legal Journal] 2004, no. 10,  
p. 475. 
69 III CZP 8/06, Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna [Decisions of the Supreme 
Court – Civil Chamber; OSNC] 2006, no. 7-8, item 123. 
70 K 26/96, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Konstytucyjnego [Decisions of Constitutional Tribunal; 
OTK] 1997, no. 2, item 19. 
71 See E. Bagińska, M. Nesterowicz, Medical Legislation in Poland, Yearbook of European 
Medical Law 2005, p. 15. 
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birth to the child and raise it, and not to eliminate the life of the foetus.  
This change in approach of the Supreme Court has met with substantial 
approval by most commentators72. 
 In the wrongful birth judgment of 13 October 200573 the Supreme 
Court held that the physicians negligently violated the plaintiff’s right  
to plan a family and the right to abortion provided by law. As a result, the 
parents were entitled to a claim for compensation of the pecuniary damage 
comprising the increased cost of the maintenance of the handicapped child 
born with a serious genetic condition. The Court referred to its motives  
in the cited judgment of 21 November 2003 and stated that the right  
of parents to plan a family, protected by Article 4a of the Law on Family 
Planning74, allowed the parents to decide about terminating pregnancy for 
genetic reasons. In consequence, a negligent breach of that right as well as 
of the right of a woman to prenatal care entitles the plaintiffs to  
pecuniary compensation. The doctrinal reaction to this decision was partly 
negative75. However, the Supreme Court in a judgment of 6 May 2010,  
II CSK 580/0976, confirmed its jurisprudence regarding liability for 
wrongful birth.  
 The protection of patients’ rights in the said context is enhanced by  
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In the judgment of 20 March 2007,  
Tysiąc v. Poland (application no. 5410/03) the European Court found  
a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention in that the Polish State 
failed to comply with its positive obligations to secure to the applicant  
the effective respect for her private life77. It held that in cases of conflicting 
                                                     
72 See e.g. R. Trzaskowski, Czy urodzenie dziecka może być źródłem szkody? [Can a Child-Birth Be 
a Cause of Damage?], Palestra [The Bar] 2007, vol. 9-10, p. 11. 
73 IV CK 161/05, Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich [Decisions of Polish Courts; OSP] 2006, no. 6, 
item 71. 
74 Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] No. 17, item 78, with later amendments. 
75 See Bagińska, supra note 65, p. 49 et seq.  
76 Orzecznictwo Sądów Polskich [Decisions of Polish Courts; OSP] 2011, no. 2, item 13,  
cmt. by M Nesterowicz. 
77 The case involved the procedure for obtaining a legal abortion. A woman (the applicant) 
who suffered from severe myopia became pregnant for the third time. After she had obtained 
medical advice in favour of abortion from a general practitioner, she went to a gynecologist 
who refused to perform the abortion. Soon after the delivery, the applicant had become 
almost blind and she lodged a criminal complaint against the gynecologist. After 
consideration of the statements of the three ophthalmologists who had examined the 
applicant during her pregnancy and a report by a panel of three medical experts, no causal 
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views (between a pregnant woman and doctors, or between the doctors 
themselves) as to whether the conditions for obtaining a legal abortion 
were satisfied or not, no effective mechanisms capable of determining  
the issue were in place. The availability of legal remedies which make  
it possible to establish liability on the part of medical staff does not imply 
that the Polish State complied with the positive obligations to safeguard the 
applicant’s right to respect for her private life in the context of  
a controversy as to whether she was entitled to a therapeutic abortion  
(at 128). The patient was awarded € 25,000 as compensation for  
non-pecuniary loss. 
 In yet another Polish case (SN judgment of 12 June 200878) the plaintiff 
claimed PLN 30,000 from a doctor (D1) as compensation for non-pecuniary 
loss caused by the infringement of her privacy in a press interview that 
revealed confidential information on her pregnancy and the identity of the 
child’s father. She also demanded a sum of PLN 20,000 (€ 4,700) from 
doctors D1, D2 and D3 (or alternatively from the hospital in T and Kraków 
University Hospital) as compensation for the infringement of personal 
rights and of the patient right to prenatal tests. The court awarded 
PLN 10,000 (€ 2,350) to be paid by doctor D1 for denigrating statements  
he had made in a press interview about the plaintiff. The other claims were 
dismissed. The judgment was quashed and the case remitted for  
re-examination by the Supreme Court. The Court stated that a pregnant 
woman has a right to free prenatal tests and that the violation of this right 
by doctors per se constitutes her moral harm, which entitles her to 
compensation pursuant to Article 448 KC, but the amount of awarded 
damages in this case was too low and not sufficiently motivated.  
On remand, Kraków Court of Appeal79 held that the defendant physician 
should pay PLN 20,000 for the failure to refer the woman for genetic testing 
as soon as the suspicions as to the foetus’ condition had arisen, as well as 
PLN 30,000 for breach of medical confidentiality. Insofar as the action was 
                                                                                                                                 
link was established between the gynaecologist’s conduct and the deterioration of the 
applicant’s vision” and the criminal case was finally dismissed. 
78 III CSK 16/08, Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna [Decisions of the 
Supreme Court – Civil Chamber; OSNC] 2009, no. 3, item 48. 
79 Judgment of 30.10.2008, not published. It is summarised by the ECtHR in the case  
RR v. Poland, application no. 27617/04, judgment of 26.05.2011. 
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directed against the T Hospital, the court held that the plaintiff had not 
received a proper diagnosis. In respect of the defendant University 
Hospital, the latter had exposed the pregnant woman to unnecessary stress, 
while the correct diagnosis had not been made. The defendants had been 
aware that time was of the essence in the availability of a legal abortion, but 
had failed to accelerate their decision-making process. As the University 
Hospital had a higher referral rate, its liability was more serious as a high 
level of professional skill could have been reasonably expected of it.  
The plaintiff had legitimately expected that she would obtain diagnostic 
and therapeutic treatment of the requisite quality, whereas her case had in 
fact been handled with unjustifiable delays. The court awarded the 
applicant PLN 5,000 (€ 1,190) against T Hospital and PLN 10,000 (€ 2,350) 
against the University Hospital. The plaintiff simultaneously filed a claim 
to the ECtHR. In the judgment RR v. Poland the ECtHR found a breach  
of both Article 3 and Article 8 of the Convention by the Polish State.  
On the facts, the Court has established “violations of the Convention on 
account of the manner in which the applicant’s requests were handled by 
health professionals and because of the State’s failure to create an effective 
procedural mechanism by which access to diagnostic services relevant for 
establishing the conditions of availability of legal abortion under Polish law 
could be secured” (opinion, at 224). As a result of the procrastination of the 
health professionals the patient had to endure weeks of painful uncertainty 
concerning the health of the foetus, her own and her family’s future and the 
prospect of raising a child suffering from an incurable ailment; she was 
deprived of access to health services guaranteed by the 1993 Act. Such 
behaviour amounts to humiliation and degrading treatment (Article 3  
of the Convention) and violated the woman’s right to privacy, as she had 
been forced to give birth to a disabled child (whereas the pregnancy could 
have been legally terminated). However, the ECtHR for the lack of a causal 
link denied compensation of pecuniary damage. As regards non-pecuniary 
losses, the Court found that “the applicant experienced considerable 
anguish and suffering, having regard to her fears about the situation of her 
family and her apprehension as to how she would be able to cope with the 
challenge of educating another child who was likely to be affected with  
a lifelong medical condition and to ensure its welfare and happiness. 
Moreover, the applicant had been humiliated by doctors’ lack of sensitivity 
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to her plight” (opinion, at 225). In conclusion, the Court awarded  
the plaintiff € 45,000 as just satisfaction. The presented judgment should  
be read as suggesting the correct method to assess the gravity of moral 
harm suffered by a pregnant woman and the extent of damages that she  
is entitled to, owing to the violation of her rights to prenatal testing and 
family planning. 
 In its jurisprudence the ECtHR emphasizes that that the states are not 
obliged to grant the citizens a right to abortion. However, if they do, just as 
the Polish state grants the statutory right to abortion in the Law on Family 
Planning of 1993, they have to guarantee its realisation; the right may not 
be illusory, purely theoretical, but must be an effective and practical right. 
  
V. PATIENTS RIGHTS AS CONSUMER RIGHTS? 
 
 In the debate about the legal nature of patients’ rights one should not 
overlook the fact that we may treat the rights similarly to consumer rights. 
The latter are better protected through a combination of both private law 
sanctions and administrative sanctions. There is a modern tendency to see  
a patient as a consumer in a transaction involving a medical service paid 
out of pocket, and correspondingly, to treat (at least some) patients’ rights 
as consumer rights80. Any medical service is certainly sought for a personal 
purpose and most of the time is not associated with the profession  
or business of a consumer. Even if we can imagine some services that might 
be indirectly associated with the business or professional activities of  
a consumer (e.g. an actress getting a liposuction, a tv-presenter getting  
a plastic surgery), the effects of the transaction are realized both in the 
business and personal sphere of the patient‘s life. There should be no doubt 
that a patient who seeks a health care service outside a publicly financed 
system should be treated as a consumer (this will allow first and foremost 
for the control of abusive contractual clauses). The privatization of heath 
                                                     
80 See J. Neuberger, Do We Need a New Word for Patients?, British Medical Journal 1998,  
no. 318, pp. 1756-1758; O. O’Donovan, D. Casey, Converting Patients’ Into Consumers: 
Consumerism and the Charter of Rights for Hospital Patients, Irish Journal of Sociology 1995,  
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care services as well as free competition will enhance the enforceability  
of patients’ rights also in the public sector.  
 The Patients’ Rights Act, which is now a basic legal fundamental  
of patients’ rights in Poland, introduces the notion of “collective patients’ 
rights”81. This category, not unquestionable, would include for instance  
a right to honest medical procedure based on medical criteria and 
determining the priority of access to medical services in cases of limited 
availability, or a right to access to medical data. The provisions of the Act 
adapt the rules on protection of consumer collective rights to the provision 
of health care services. Their aim is to enhance the range of remedies 
available to the aggrieved patient and to remedy the deficiencies of the tort 
law protection. In particular, collective patients’ rights are to be enforced  
by a special organ – the Patient Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is designed 
as a national organ (central administrative authority) who is competent  
i.a. to impose administrative fines for the violations of patients’ collective 
rights (Article 61 of the Patients’ Rights Act)82. The creation of another layer  
of protection of patients’ rights involves a shift from fault to strict liability. 
Wrongfulness of the infringement is sufficient to order an injunction  
or an administrative fine (Article 59 sec. 2 of the Patients’ Rights Act).  
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  
 
 The above analysis leads to the conclusion that patients’ rights merit  
an express rule on their pecuniary protection in order to abolish the 
requirement of proving that a certain right is recognized as a protected 
interest (which is a conditio sine qua non of a potential civil liability of  
the violator). This can be done either by including all (or almost all) 
patients’ rights into the category of “personality rights” (interests) or by  
an explicit recognition of the rights and interests as a separate normative 
                                                     
81 Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] 2009, No. 52, item 417 and No. 76, item 641. 
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(sub-) category, which would be subject to the same or to a similar regime 
of protection as the one granted to personality interests. Such recognition  
is of course facilitated by the international and supranational conventions 
and other documents. In fact, even before the Biomedical Convention came 
into force, a statutory regulation of patient rights had eased the position of  
a patient in court in many countries (e.g. Poland, Portugal83). But this did 
not necessarily mean that patients were granted a claim for pecuniary 
compensation for the infringement of their rights not associated with 
personal injury. 
 It is trivial to say that with respect to the protection of patients’ rights 
the “law in books” does not coincide with the “law in action”. The system 
of administration of justice has a primary impact on the insufficient 
enforcement of patients’ rights. As a matter of fact, the average Polish 
patient is not aware of his rights, and most people still think that a claim for 
damages may be brought only in a case of medical malpractice and not 
when “only” dignity, autonomy, or privacy was violated by a doctor  
or medical personnel84. Therefore, a person who has suffered a violation  
of patients’ rights, regardless of whether he or she has suffered any 
damage, should have an explicit claim for pecuniary compensation for  
the violation, which is separate from a claim for reparation of moral harm 
due to personal injury.  
 It remains an open question whether some patient rights should  
be afforded better protection. I am of the view that depending on the 
contents of a patient right it may be given a more extensive protection, 
allied with the scope of protection of the underlying personality interest 
(right to privacy, self determination, data protection). It is generally agreed 
that legal interests such as human dignity and liberty deserve a wider 
protection of tort law than property interests (comp. Article 2:102 Principles 
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of European Tort Law85). For example, in France, the fault in the invasion  
of privacy cases is incorporated in the infringement test86, while in Poland,  
the wrongfulness of the invasion is presumed by law (Article 24 KC). 
 The complex nature of patients’ rights calls for a distinction between 
the rights that are types of personal interests and other (non-absolute) 
rights. In Poland, Article 4 sec. 3 of the Patients’ Rights Act narrows  
the protection granted to the right to safety of valuables deposited in  
a hospital, to the right to information about the scope and type of health 
care services offered by health care providers, and to the right of the patient 
to access to his medical record. In all three cases the aggrieved patient  
has no claim for a pecuniary redress.  
 I am strongly inclined to say that a claim for non-pecuniary loss is  
a most important civil sanction in cases of an infringement of patients’ 
rights, providing a serious protection of the dignity, privacy, and 
autonomy of a patient, regardless of the diligence and effectiveness of  
a medical intervention. This solution answers the question of classifying 
the liability of medical professionals and institutions ad casum as 
contractual (e.g. in Germany) or tortious (e.g. Poland). It also helps  
to overcome problems encountered in those systems where damages for  
non-pecuniary loss may be awarded in specific cases (Poland, Austria),  
in particular only in a tort regime (this problem is alleviated in the systems 
that recognise the concurrence of causes of liability). 
 Finally, it is difficult to resist citing W. V. H. Rogers’s conclusion that 
“the fact that [human interests] are not easily valued in monetary terms, 
and that their infringement may be less catastrophic for an individual than 
a very serious personal injury does not mean that they are unimportant, 
looked at from the point of view of the maintenance of a decent society”87. 
This thought allows me to suggest that the establishment of a pecuniary 
claim for a “simple”, i.e. not leading to personal injury, violation  
of patients’ rights is an idea to be accepted by all (or almost all) European 
systems. 
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